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2I F A U – D o e s t a x e v a s i o n a ﬀect unemployment and educational choice?1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last couple of years have witnessed a surge of academic as well as
journalistic writings on tax evading activities.1 One reason for this interest
is that tax evasion opportunities may create various distortions in the
behaviour of economic agents. For example, too much work may be carried
out in the informal sector if consumer wages are relatively higher in this
sector.2
In this paper we argue that the choice to acquire higher education
may also be distorted by tax evasion opportunities. If workers with a
lower level of education to a larger extent face job opportunities in an in-
formal sector, there are less incentives to acquire higher education. More
informal job opportunities, higher taxes and lower punishment fees reduce
the relative pay-oﬀ from education which, in turn, induce less workers to
educate themselves. This hypotheses is consistent with data. For exam-
ple, using survey data of the shadow sector in Sicily, Boeri and Garibaldi
(2002) show that mainly workers at the lower end of the skill distrib-
ution engage in informal activities. Pedersen and Smith (1998), using
comprehensive survey data, show that almost half of the informal sec-
tor activities in Denmark are carried out within the construction sector.
They also ﬁnd that around 70 percent of the total hours performed in
the informal sector is carried out within the service sector or construc-
tion sector. Furthermore, Pedersen (2003), using the same questionnaire
design for ﬁve countries, concludes that most informal activity in Great
Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is carried out within the construc-
tion sector. In Germany most informal activity takes place within a group
of sectors denoted: Fishing, Agriculture (including tree-felling and gar-
dening) and Mining. Finally, performing logistic regressions for the ﬁve
countries, Pedersen (2003) conﬁrms that skilled blue color workers carry
out more black market activities than others, and that the likelihood of
black market activities falls with the length of education.3
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two surveys
of tax avoidance and tax evasion.
2See Pedersen and Smith (1998) for evidence for Denmark. One can note that
tax evasion opportunities may, in fact, also reduce distortions. Tax evasion may, for
example, reduce the distortion caused by too high consumption of untaxed leisure.
3Note also that in the literature on crime, it is often stressed that workers with
low market wages have more incentives to commit crimes. Most empirical studies of
criminal incomes ﬁnd that criminal activities oﬀers low skill men higher hourly wages
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 3With this evidence in mind, the aim of the paper is threefold. First,w e
want to examine how the government tax and punishment policies aﬀect
the incentives to acquire higher education. Second,w ew a n tt oe x a m i n e
how labour market performance, including wage formation, unemploy-
ment, wage dispersion, and the size of the informal sector is aﬀected by
tax and punishment policies. Third, we aim at characterizing the optimal
tax and punishment system.
To that end, we develop a three-sector general equilibrium model fea-
turing matching frictions and worker-ﬁrm wage bargains. Workers diﬀer
in ability and decide whether or not to acquire higher education. We
assume that it is costly in terms of eﬀort to acquire higher education, im-
plying that only high ability workers ﬁnd this worthwhile. Only workers
who choose not to acquire higher education, whom we refer to as man-
ual workers, face job opportunities in both the formal and the informal
sector. This assumption approximates that employment opportunities in
an informal sector to a larger extent face workers with a lower level of
education. Unemployed manual workers search for jobs in both sectors by
allocating their search eﬀort optimally between them.
We ﬁnd that increased government punishment of the informal sec-
tor reduces the size of this sector. Moreover, the number of unemployed
workers is likely to fall, formal wage dispersion increases, and the number
of highly educated workers increases. While considering welfare, we ﬁnd
that it is optimal to choose the punishment rates so to more than fully
counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the
informal sector. The optimal choice of tax and punishment system, how-
ever, implies an ineﬃciently low stock of educated workers.
Early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where underreporting of in-
come is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent pa-
pers have enhanced the basic model of individual behaviour by, for ex-
ample, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions.4 Also general
than legitimate activities. See Freeman (1999) for a survey of the economics of crime.
Also, the theoretical study by Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) develops a model where
workers are less likely to commit crimes when their wages are higher. This has a parallel
to informal sector work where high skill workers may not to the same extent get full
pay-oﬀ for their higher productivity, which makes informal activities less attractive for
highly educated workers.
4See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of
endogenous labour supply and underreporting of income.
4I F A U – D o e s t a x e v a s i o n a ﬀect unemployment and educational choice?equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed (for an excel-
lent example see Cremer and Gahvari (1993)). Several theoretical papers
have also recognized that the opportunities for tax evasion diﬀer across
occupations. See for example Watson (1985), and Pestieau and Possen
(1991). Occupational choice in this literature is usually thought of as a
choice between self-employment, where under-reporting is possible, and
regular employment, where under-reporting is not an option. Pestieau
and Possen (1991) assume that workers choose either to be entrepreneurs
or regular employees. Workers diﬀer in risk aversion and under-reporting
is only available for entrepreneurs. They argue that tax evasion should be
allowed to some degree in order to maintain a large stock of productive
entrepreneurs.
The principal contribution of the analyses in this paper is that we
shed light on how the presence of work opportunities in an informal sector
can aﬀect the educational attainment in an economy. This has, to our
knowledge, not been explored in the previous literature. Another impor-
tant contribution is that we incorporate an imperfectly competitive labour
market, which facilitates an analysis of how tax and punishment policies
aﬀect wage setting and unemployment. Previous research is mainly con-
ducted within the public ﬁnance tradition, where wages are either assumed
to be ﬁxed or determined by market clearing. By deﬁnition, such frame-
work is unable to examine how involuntary unemployment is aﬀected by
tax and punishment policies.
There have, however, been some recent studies of how tax and pun-
ishment policies aﬀect involuntary unemployment; see Kolm and Larsen
(2001,2002), Cavalcanti (2002), Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) and Fugazza
and Jacques (2003). This paper diﬀers from these previous studies in
that it does not rely on relative price adjustments (as Kolm and Larsen,
2001, 2002, and Cavalcanti, 2002) or heterogeneity in moral attitudes and
a ﬁxed number of vacancies (as Fugazzi and Jacques, 2003), to generate
a stable equilibrium where both formal and informal jobs coexist. Nei-
ther does it rely on the assumption that informal jobs only come about
as matched formal jobs are hit by a bad productivity shock (as Boeri and
Garibaldi, 2002) in order to generate coexistence of formal and informal
jobs. Rather this paper assumes directed search where the unemployed
workers are optimally allocating search eﬀort into both the formal and
the informal sector. We assume that the eﬀectiveness of search falls with
search time into a sector. This could capture that diﬀerent search meth-
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 5ods are used when searching for a job in a market. The more time that
is used in order to search in a market, the less eﬃcient search methods
have to be used. This particular modeling strategy of search eﬀort has a
close resemblance to how search is modelled in van den Berg and van der
Klaauw (2001). They extend the Mortensen (1986) model to account for
that workers can use more than one search channel when seeking for a job,
and generate an optimal split of search time between diﬀerent channels by
assuming increasing and convex search costs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3, examines how the equilibrium variables (e.g. tightness, wages, wage
dispersion, employment and unemployment rates, unemployment stock,
and the stock of educated workers) are aﬀected by a fully ﬁnanced change
in the punishment system. Section 4 concerns the optimal design of tax
and punishment policies. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l 5
The economy consists of a labour force which diﬀers in ability to ac-
quire education. Abilities, e, are uniformly distributed between 0 and
1,e ∈ [0,1]. Based on ability, workers decide whether or not to educate
themselves. We assume that it is costless to become a manual worker, but
that workers who educate themselves ﬁnd it costly to do so.6 The cost of
education, c(e) is decreasing in ability, c0(e) < 0.
Manual workers face job opportunities in both a formal and an informal
sector, whereas highly educated workers only face employment opportu-
nities in a formal sector. This is a simplifying assumption approximating
the fact that manual workers perform informal sector work to a much
higher extent than highly educated workers. The economy thus consists
of three sectors; the formal manual sector (denoted the formal sector F),
the informal manual sector (denoted the informal sector I), and the highly
educated sector (denoted h). Manual workers have productivity ym and
highly educated workers have productivity yh >y m.
5The model is along the line of Pissarides (2000).
6This is a simplifying assumption, allowing us to focus on the choice between two
skill levels.
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2.1.1 Matching
The manual workers search for jobs in the formal and the informal sec-
tor. For simplicity, we assume that only unemployed workers search for
jobs. This is a simpliﬁcation, i.e. we do not acknowledge that the con-
nection to the labour market given by working in the formal sector may
bring about job opportunities not available while unemployed. Workers
accept job oﬀers as long as the expected payoﬀ exceeds their reserva-










¢η ,j= F,I, where X
j
m is the sectorial matching
rate, v
j
m, is the sectorial vacancy rate, and um is the unemployment rate
facing manual workers. The rates are deﬁned as the numbers relatively to
the manual labour force. Manual workers allocate search eﬀort optimally
between the formal and the informal sector. Each worker’s total search
intensity is exogenously given and normalised to unity, where σI = σ de-
notes search eﬀort directed towards the informal sector, and σF =1− σ
denotes search eﬀort directed towards the formal sector. The parameter
γ<1 captures that the eﬀectiveness of search falls with search eﬀort,
i.e., the ﬁrst unit of search in one sector is more eﬀective than the subse-
quent units of search. The transition rates into formal and informal sec-
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m denote the expected present values of unemployment,
and employment in the two sectors. The value functions for worker i then









m/um. This is, however, of no importance for the results.
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m − Umi), (1)
rEF
mi = R + wF
mi (1 − t)+s(Um − EF
mi), (2)
rEI
mi = R + wI
mi (1 − pδ)+( s + p)(Um − EI
mi), (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, w
j
m is the sector wage, and s is the
exogenous separation rate. R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals
receive from the government which reﬂects that the government has some
positive revenue requirements. The parameter t is the proportional income
tax rate, p is the probability of being detected working in the informal sec-
tor, and δ is the proportion of the evaded income the worker has to pay as
a punishment fee if detected. The match is dissolved when detected which
implies that the separation rate in the informal sector exceeds the formal
sector separation rate. For simplicity, we disregard from unemployment
beneﬁts.
Let JF
m and V F
m represent the expected present values of an occupied
job and a vacant job in the formal sector, respectively. The arbitrage
equations for a job paying the wage wF
mi a n dav a c a n tj o bi nt h ef o r m a l
sector are then
rJF
mi = ym − wF






m − V F
m) − k, (5)
where z is the payroll tax rate and ym is productivity. Vacancy costs are
denoted k. Analogous notation for the informal sector yields:
rJI
mi = ym − wI






m − V I
m) − k, (7)
where α is the proportion of the evaded wage the ﬁrm has to pay as a
punishment fee if detected.
The unemployed worker i allocates search between the two sectors,
σi, in order to maximize the value of unemployment, rUmi. A necessary
condition for an interior solution is that γ<1, which holds by assumption.
















Workers allocate their search between sectors to equalize returns to
search eﬀort across the two sectors.
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When a worker and ﬁrm meet they bargain over the wage, w
j
mi,t a k i n g
economy wide variables as given. The ﬁrst order conditions from the Nash
bargaining solutions, with the worker’s bargaining power being equal to












m − Um, (10)
where φt = 1+z
1−t and φp =
1+pα
1−pδ are the tax and punishment wedges, and




We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated
between the two sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by substituting (9)






m from (5) and (7)




















is the wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. We can
interpret a ψ<1 as if the informal sector is punished to a lesser extent
than the formal sector is taxed.8
Equation (11) is the core equilibrium equation. Recall from (8) that
workers allocate their search between sectors so that the marginal returns
to search eﬀort in the two sectors are equal. With wages being endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium, this implies to account for the wedge, ψ,






8In contrast, if ψ =1 , the informal sector is punished equally hard as the formal
sector is taxed. With risk neutral individuals there is, in one sense, no substantial
diﬀerence between the tax system and the punishment system since the punishment
system is a randomized tax system.
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a lesser extent than the formal sector is taxed, ψ<1, unemployed work-
ers tend to direct more search into the informal sector. And the relatively
tighter the formal sector is, the larger formal sector search tends to be.
By use of equation (1)-(7) and (11) in equations (9) and (10), equilib-
rium producer wages, ω
j
m,j= F,I,a r eg i v e nb y :
ωF
m = wF



















Wages increase with labour market tightness and decrease with search
intensity in each sector. This follows as a higher labour market tightness
and a lower search intensity improve the worker’s bargaining position. An
increase in tightness makes it easier for an unemployed worker to ﬁnd a job,
and at the same time harder for a ﬁrm to ﬁll a vacancy. This improves the
worker’s relative bargaining position, resulting in higher wage demands.
An increase in search, will instead reduce the worker’s bargaining position.
This follows as the eﬀectiveness of search falls with more search, i.e., γ<1.
Sectorial wage demands are hence moderated with increased search into
the sector.9
From (13), (14) together with (11) it follows that producer wages in
the formal sector exceed informal sector producer wages when ψ<1,
and vice versa when ψ>1. Moreover, rewriting (13) and (14) in terms of
consumer wages we have that consumer wages in the formal sector subceed
informal sector consumer wages when ψ<1, and vice versa when ψ>1.
More speciﬁcally we have ωF − ωI =
βkθF
(1−σ)1−γ (1 − ψ) and wF
m (1 − t) −
wI
m (1 − pδ)=
βym
φp (ψ − 1).
9An alternative way of describing the intuition for why increased sector search re-
duces wage demands is the following. When search time into one sector increases, the
bargaining position for ﬁrms in that sector improves. This follows as ﬁrms in that sec-
tor then will ﬁn di te a s i e rt om a t c hw i t han e ww o r k e ri nc a s eo fn oa g r e e m e n t . T h e
improved bargaining position for ﬁrms moderates wage pressure. Analogous reasoning
holds in case search eﬀort into a secctor falls.
10 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?2.1.4 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are
determined by equation (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition




















With ψ<1, informal producer wages are lower than formal producer
wages and hence the expected instantaneous proﬁts in the informal sector
exceed the instantaneous proﬁts in the formal sector.10 This makes it
more attractive for ﬁrms to enter the informal sector which tends to make
informal tightness exceed formal tightness. However, as the separation
rate in the formal sector is lower, s<s+p, the formal sector expected job
duration is longer. This makes the formal sector more attractive to enter.
Consequently, it is possible to have θF
m >θ I
m, although ψ<1.
2.2 Highly educated workers
Highly educated workers applying for jobs in sector h do not have the
opportunity to obtain employment in an informal sector. The total time
unit of search is allocated into search in sector h,i . e . ,σh =1 . The matching
function is given by a standard matching function, Xh =( vh)
1−η (uh)
η,
where vh is the vacancy rate and uh is the unemployment rate for educated
workers. Worker and ﬁrm transition rates then become λh =( θh)
1−η ,
θh = vh
uh,a n dqh = θ
−η
h . Educated workers pay the individual educational
costs c(ei),w h e r eei is the worker’s ability, ei ∈ [0,1] and c0(ei) < 0.
Let Uh and Eh denote the expected present values of unemployment and
10The right-hand side of equations (15) and (16), are simply the instantaneous proﬁts,
i.e., π
F = ym −ω
F
m and π
I = ym −ω
I





(1−σ)γ (1 − ψ).
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rEhi = R + whi (1 − t)+s(Uhi − Ehi) − c(ei), (17)
rUhi = R + λh(Eh − Uh) − c(ei). (18)
where wh denotes the wage for educated workers.
Sector h ﬁrms employ workers with the marginal productivity yh and
have the time unit probability qh of ﬁlling a vacancy. Let Jh and Vh
represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a vacant job
in the educated sector. The arbitrage equations for a job and a vacant job
in the educated sector are:
rJhi = yh − whi (1 + z)+s(Vh − Jhi), (19)
rVh = qh(Jh − Vh) − k. (20)
Wages, whi, are determined by Nash Bargaining with the workers’
bargaining power equal to β.T h e ﬁrst order condition can be written
analogous to equation (9). We can solve for the bargained wage by using
this ﬁrst order condition and equations (17)-(20), assuming free entry,
(i.e., Vh =0 ), and a symmetric equilibrium. The bargained wage is given
by: ωh = wh (1 + z)=β (yh + θhk). Labour market tightness in sector
h,θh, can be derived from equations (19) and (20), using the free entry
condition and the expression for wh:
k(r + s)θ
η
h =( 1− β)yh − βθhk. (21)
2.3 Education
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain a
manual worker, they compare the value of unemployment as an educated
worker to the value of unemployment as a manual worker. Workers with
low ability ﬁnd it too costly in terms of eﬀort to acquire higher educa-
tion, whereas high ability workers ﬁnd it more than worthwhile to do so
since they face lower costs of education. The marginal worker has an
ability level, ˆ e, which makes him just indiﬀerent between acquiring higher
11We assume that the educational cost is a cost to acquire and maintain skill. This is
a simplifying assumption and is not important for the results. The assumption enables
us to use a model without having workers continuously being born and dying. Such a
m o d e lw o u l d ,h o w e v e r ,g e n e r a t et he same qualitative expressions.
12 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?education and remaining a manual worker. We can write the condition
determining the ability level of the marginal worker as:
rUh = rUm. (22)
We can rewrite this expression in a number of ways using earlier
equations. For example, by using equations (1)-(3), it is clear that the
value of unemployment for a manual worker is captured by rUm = R +
µF
mwF
m (1 − t)+µI
mwI
m (1 − pδ). This expression reveals that it is the con-
sumer wages in the formal and informal sector, weighted by the employ-
ment opportunities in each sector that is important for the unemployment
value of manual workers.12 A similar expression can be derived for the
value of unemployment as a educated worker; rUh = R + µhwh (1 − t) −
c(e) from (17) and (18), where µh = λh/(r + s + λh).
As wages are endogenous we can use equations (1), (18), and (22)
together with the ﬁrst order conditions for wages, and equations (5), (7),















Equation (23) gives ˆ e as a function of the endogenous variables θh,
θF
m,a n dσ.W o r k e r sw i t he ≤ ˆ e, choose not to acquire education, whereas
workers with e>ˆ e acquire education. Hence, ˆ e and 1 − ˆ e resolve the
manual and educated labour forces, respectively.
2.4 Unemployment
Steady state employment and unemployment rates for manual and edu-
cated workers are derived by considering the ﬂows into and out of em-
ployment. The equations determining the employment rates in the for-
mal sector and the informal sector, nF
m,n I
m, and the manual unemploy-
ment rate, um, are given by: λI
mumˆ e =( s + p)nI
mˆ e, λF




m =1− um. The unemployment rate for manual workers that is
observable by the government, uo
m, is given by uo






























m when the discount rate approaches
zero. Consequently, when ignoring discounting, the weights are given by the expected
time a worker will be employed in each sector.
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For sector h, ﬂows into unemployment and out of unemployment are







Comparing equations (25) and (26), note that we cannot immediately
determine whether unemployment facing manual workers is higher or lower
than unemployment for educated workers. Higher productivity for edu-
cated workers, yh >y m together with the higher average separation rate
for manual workers, tends to make um exceed uh. However, as manual
workers can apply for jobs in two sectors, which the educated worker can-
not, uh tends to exceed um.
The actual and oﬃcial total number of unemployed workers are given
by UTOT =ˆ eum +( 1− ˆ e)uh,U o
TOT =ˆ euo
m +( 1− ˆ e)uh.
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium equations determining labour market tightness in the three
sectors (θF
m,θI
m,θh) search intensity (σ) and the number of educated work-













































Labour market tightness in the two sectors employing manual workers
are determined together with search intensity in (27), (28), and (29). In-
dependently, we solve for labour market tightness in sector h from (30).
Finally, the labour force allocation into manual workers and educated
workers is determined by (31) given the solutions for θF
m,θh, and σ.S e e
the Appendix for details about stability and uniqueness.
3C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
This section is concerned with the impact of the tax and punishment
system on tightness, search intensity, producer wages, employment and
unemployment rates, wage dispersion, the number of unemployed workers,
and the number of educated workers. Proofs of all Propositions are given
in the Appendix.
We only consider fully ﬁnanced changes in the punishment rates. Hence,
changes in the punishment rates, α or δ, are always followed by adjust-
ments in the tax rates, z or t, so as to balance the government budget

























where R is the exogenous government revenue requirements and ξ (p) is
auditing costs.13
13We note that the tax and punishment rates, t and z and δ and α, will not appear in
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 153.1 Tightness, search intensity, and producer wages
The eﬀects on tightness and allocation of search is summarized in the
following proposition.14
Proposition 1 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in a punishment rate (δ or α)
will reallocate search intensity towards the formal sector (σ falls). Fur-
thermore it will increase tightness in the formal sector (θF
m)a n dr e d u c e
tightness in the informal sector (θI
m). Tightness in sector h (θh)i sl e f t
unaﬀected.
When tax evasion is punished more severely, unemployed workers will
ﬁnd it optimal to reallocate their search towards the formal sector. How-
ever, when search eﬀort is reallocated towards the formal sector, wage
demands in the formal sector fall whereas wage demands in the informal
sector increase. This follows as the eﬀectiveness of search in the formal
sector falls as search increases, which weakens the workers’ bargaining po-
sition. In contrast, the reduced search in the informal sector increases
the eﬀectiveness of informal sector search. This improves the bargaining
position for workers in the informal sector. As the producer wage facing
informal sector ﬁrms tends to increase, and the formal sector producer
wage tends to fall, ﬁrms will exit the informal sector and enter the formal
sector; formal sector tightness increases whereas informal sector tightness
falls. As formal sector tightness raises relative to tightness in the informal
sector, search is further reallocated towards the formal sector. This eﬀect
becomes smaller and smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
Tax rates will have no impact on the producer wage and tightness in
sector h. Tax changes will always be absorbed by changes in the consumer
the government budget restriction or in (24)-(31) other than through φ
t and φ
p.T h i s
reﬂects that it does not matter if we tax (punish) the ﬁrm side or the worker side.









m,u m,a n du
o
m. Moreover, from (32) it is clear that revenues, R,i n c r e a s ei nφ
t
and φ
p for a given ψ. Thus, any revenue requirement, R, can be attained by increasing
φ
t and φ
p simultaneously so to keep ψ constant. This is a very convenient property
when considering fully ﬁnanced reforms.
14For an intuitive intrepretation, propositions 1-4 are expressed as if an increase in
φ
p ﬁnanced by adjustments in φ
t implies that ψ = φ
p/φ
t increases. Other, although
perhaps less plausible cases, are of course also incorporated. The propositions simply
capture fully ﬁnanced changes in the tax and punishment systems that aﬀect the relative
tax and punishment rates, ψ, between the formal and informal economy.
16 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?wage, leaving producer wages and tightness unaﬀected in the sector.15
We summarize the eﬀects on producer wages in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the punishment rates (δ or
α) will increase the producer wage in the informal sector (ωI
m)a n dr e d u c e
the producer wage in the formal sector (ωF
m). The producer wage in sector
h (ωh)i su n a ﬀected by changes in the tax and punishment rates.
Formal sector wage demands are reduced because the worker-ﬁrm bar-
gaining position falls as search in the sector becomes less eﬀective. In
contrast, wage demands increase in the informal sector as informal sector
search becomes more eﬀective with the reduces search eﬀort in the sector.
H o w e v e r ,t h e r ew i l lb ead a m p e n i n ge ﬀect on wages due to that formal
sector tightness increases and informal sector tightness falls.
3.2 Employment and unemployment rates
We summarize the results of the impact of the tax and punishment rates
on the employment and unemployment rates in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the punishment rate (δ or α)
will increase the employment rate in the formal sector (nF
m)a n dr e d u c e
t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei nt h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o r( nI
m). The unemployment rate
for manual workers that are observable by the government (uo
m) falls. The
actual unemployment rate for manual workers (um)f a l l si fψ<1.T h e
unemployment rate for educated workers (uh)i su n a ﬀected.
It comes as no surprise that increased punishment of the informal
sector induces a reallocation of manual workers from the informal towards
the formal sector. The formal sector employment rate increases as the
transition rate into formal sector employment increases. This, in turn,
is caused by the increase in formal sector tightness and the reallocation
of search eﬀort towards the formal sector. In contrast, as tightness and
15This follows because we have iso-elastic preferences and a constant replacement
rate of unemployment beneﬁts. With unemployment insurance being equal to zero,
we have both ﬁxed beneﬁt si nr e a lt e r m sa sw e l la saﬁxed replacement rate. This
is a standard result in most models featuring unemployment in equilibrium; see, for
example, Pissarides (2000).
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 17search eﬀort in the informal sector fall, the transition rate into informal
employment, and consequently the sectorial employment rate, falls.
The unemployment rate for manual workers falls as workers are reallo-
cated towards the formal sector where jobs last on average a longer time.16
In addition, the oﬃcial unemployment rate falls both because the actual
unemployment rate falls, and because workers are reallocated towards the
formal sector.
3.3 Wage dispersion
Wage dispersion in terms of wages received by formal sector manual work-






















As wage dispersion is increased whenever ωF
m is reduced, we have the
following result:
Proposition 4 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the punishment rate (δ or α)
will increase wage dispersion between formal sector manual workers and
educated workers.
Increased punishment reduces formal sector wages for manual workers
and hence increases the wage dispersion in-between educated workers and
formal sector manual workers.
3.4 Education
A closer examination of (31) reveals that changes in the punishment rates,
φp =
1+pα
1−pδ ,a ﬀects the share of educated workers, 1 − ˆ e, through ψ only,
whereas changes in the tax rates, φt = 1+z
1−t,h a v ead i r e c te ﬀect on 1 − ˆ e
16In case ψ>1, the number of vacancies relatively to unemployment is reduced which
will have a counteracting eﬀect on unemployment. Consequently, the unemployment
rate may increase in this case. Recall that ψ<1 corresponds to the empirically most
plausible case where producer wages in the formal sector exceed those in the informal
sector, and where consumer wages in the informal sector exceeds those in the formal
sector.
18 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?in addition to the eﬀects working through ψ.17 Therefore, in order to
consider the eﬀects of a fully ﬁnanced change in the punishment rates on
the number of educated workers, we have to account for repercussions on
1−ˆ e following adjustments in the tax rates. However, let us ﬁrst consider
t h ei m p a c to n1−ˆ e of a change in the tax and punishment rates separately:






φt¢2 D1c0 (ˆ e)
Ã
















∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φt |φp = −ψ
∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φp |φt +
c(ˆ e)
c0 (ˆ e)φt < 0. (34)
Equation (33) shows that the number of educated workers increases
with higher punishment rates for a given tax system. This summarizes
the impact through several channels. First, there is a direct eﬀect which
induces more workers to educate themselves as increased punishment for
a given tax system reduces the informal sector consumer wage. However,
increased punishment rates also aﬀect consumer wages through the wage
negotiations; wages are reduced in the formal sector but increased in the
informal sector. Moreover, employment opportunities increases in the for-
mal sector but falls in the informal sector. This is a consequence of the
fact that tightness and search in the formal sector increases whereas the
opposite movements take place in the informal sector. The negative im-
pact on the value of being a manual worker, rUm, dominates. Hence more
workers will educate themselves as increased punishment of the informal
sector makes it less attractive to remain a manual worker.
Equation (34) gives the impact on the number of educated workers as
the tax rates increases, for a given punishment system. The ﬁrst term
captures the eﬀect on the educated labour force of an increase in the
tax rates working through ψ. Increased taxation induces the opposite
movements as was described in connection to equation (33) and analogous
reasoning can be conducted. The second term in (34) captures the impact
of increased taxation for a given wedge, ψ. Increased taxation reduces the
consumer wages for both educated and manual workers, but it will not
17Recall that the producer wage and the transition rate into employment in sector
h is independent of the tax and punishment rates. Moreover, the producer wages and
the transition rates into employment in sector F and I, only depend on the tax and
punishment rates through the wedge, ψ.
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 19aﬀect the costs of higher education. Consequently, the value of being an
educated worker falls by relative more than the value of being a manual
worker; the number of educated workers falls. As the eﬀects work in the
same direction, we conclude that the number of educated workers in the
economy tends to decrease with increased taxation.
In order to consider fully ﬁnanced increases in the punishment rates,
we need to consider the impact of the tax and punishment rates on the
government revenues. The tax and punishment rates aﬀect the government
revenues in a number of ways (details are given in an appendix). Assuming
that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curves, and
hence dynamic adjustments in equilibrium wages, employment rates and
labour forces are not dominating the direct eﬀects, government revenue
increases with increased tax rates and punishment rates.18 An increase
in the punishment rate accordingly calls for reductions in the tax rates in
order to maintain a balanced budget. We can then rewrite the government
budget restriction in (32) as φt = h(φp),w h e r e
∂φt
∂φp < 0.W e h a v e t h e
following result.
Proposition 5 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the punishment rate (δ or α)
w i l li n c r e a s et h en u m b e ro fe d u c a t e dw o r k e r s .
3.5 Unemployment
This section is concerned with how the number of unemployed workers
is aﬀected by changes in the tax and punishment systems. As is clear
from section 2.4, the total number of unemployed workers, as well as the
number of unemployed workers observable by the government, depends on
the division of labour across sectors. Since the division of labour across
sectors depends on the tax rates, φt, separate from the wedge, ψ,w e
have to account for the government budget restriction explicitly. Again
we assume that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer
curves.19
Proposition 6 Af u l l yﬁnanced increase in the punishment rate (δ or α)
will reduce total unemployment, ∂UTOT
∂φp < 0,i fψ<1 and the rate of
18Or we could equally well allow for the case where we are located on the negatively
sloped side of the Laﬀer curve, and hence the direct eﬀects are dominated by the dynamic
eﬀects. See appendix for details.
19See previous footnote.
20 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?unemployed manual workers is higher than the rate of unemployment of
higher educated workers, um >u h.
In the empirically relevant case where unemployment for manual work-
ers is higher than unemployment of educated workers, higher punishment
rates reduce total unemployment. There is both a direct impact from a
reduction in the unemployment rate for manual workers and an indirect
impact through the shift of workers from the manual labour force towards
the educated labour force.
4W e l f a r e
This section is concerned with welfare analysis and the optimal design of
tax and punishment policies. As we showed in Section 3.4, a reduction in
the attractiveness of the informal sector, makes it relatively less attractive
to be a manual worker. This induces more workers to educate themselves.
We concluded that increasing the wedge between the informal and the
formal sector increases the number of educated workers by reducing the
relative attractiveness to be a manual worker. Consequently, the size of
the wedge is an important determinant of the size of the educated labour
force.
This is essential when considering welfare. If economic policy is con-
ducted so as to ﬁght the underground economy, increasing the punishment
rates will at the same time increase the number of educated workers. In
case the educated labour force is ineﬃciently low, this provides an addi-
tional argument for ﬁghting the informal sector. If, on the other hand, the
educated labour force is ineﬃciency high, combatting the informal sector
induces a welfare cost in the sense that the educated labour force becomes
even higher.
This suggests that the punishment rates are potential instruments that
c a nb eu s e dt oa ﬀect the number of educated workers and thereby welfare.
There may, of course, be other more direct instruments if the pure aim
is to correct for ineﬃciencies in the educational level in an economy, but
nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the wedge actually has an
impact on the number of educated workers and thereby potentially has an
impact on welfare in the economy. This becomes clear if we take a closer
look at the welfare eﬀects of the model.
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 21We make use of a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by
adding all individuals’ and ﬁrms’ steady state ﬂow values of welfare. In
order to disregard from congestion externalities we assume that β = η.
The social welfare function is written as:


















˜ Wh = uhrUh +( 1− uh)rEh +( 1− uh)rJh + vhrVh.
We assume that ﬁrms are owned by ”rentiers” who do not work. By
making use of the asset equations for workers and ﬁrms in the three sectors,
imposing the ﬂow equilibrium conditions as well as the government budget
restriction in (32), and considering the case of no discounting, i.e., r → 0,
we can write the welfare function as:
W = Wmˆ e +
Z 1
ˆ e
Whde − ξ (p), (35)
where
Wm =( 1 − um)ym − umΘk, (36)






m (1 − σ)
γ¢
.20 With the assumption of risk neu-
tral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages will not
feature in the welfare function.
Examining the welfare measure in (35) reveals that we have to consider
both how the tax and punishment system aﬀects the welfare of the manual
and highly educated sector, Wm and Wh, and how it aﬀects the stock of
manual and highly educated workers, 1 − ˆ e. We see from the welfare
speciﬁcation in (35), (36), and (37) that changes in the punishment rates,
δ or α,o n l ya ﬀects welfare through its eﬀect on the wedge, ψ. The wedge,
20This welfare measure is analogous to the welfare measure described in, for example,
Pissarides (2000) as it gives the aggregate production minus total vacancy costs, i.e. we





k. The educational cost is of course added as a cost to the
welfare measure.
22 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?in turn, aﬀects total welfare, W, through its impact on welfare for manual
workers, Wm, and through its impact on the number workers acquiring
education, 1 − ˆ e. As is clear from (37), Wh is independent of the tax and
punishment rates. Changes in the tax rates, t and z, on the other hand,
aﬀects W through the wedge, ψ, but it will also have a direct eﬀect on the
number of workers acquiring education.
Let us ﬁrst consider how a change in the number of workers acquir-
ing education inﬂuence the social welfare measure. We can conclude the
following:
∂W
∂ (1 − ˆ e)





Welfare raises when more workers acquire education whenever the
number of educated workers are too low from a welfare point of view.
Similarly, welfare falls as more workers acquire education when too many
workers are educated from a welfare perspective.21
By looking at the market solution for the stock of educated workers, it
is clear that it is exclusively the tax and punishment system that distorts




(1 − uh)ωh − nFωF − 1
ψnIωI
´
= c(ˆ e) by using the expressions
for rUm and rUh from sections 2.1 and 2.2. We note that there are two
sources through which the tax and punishment system distorts the educa-
tional choice, namely through the punishment tax wedge, ψ, and through
the tax rates, φt.
The ﬁrst distortion on educational choice appears when ψ departs from
unity. When ψ<1, being a manual worker is rather pleasant as attrac-
tive employment opportunities in an informal sector are available. This
reduces the incentives of education, which tends to imply that too few
workers educate themselves. For ψ>1, on the other hand, employment
opportunities in an informal sector are not very attractive as the expected
punishment rates are higher than the tax rates. This increases the incen-
tives of education, tending to make too many people educate themselves.
The second distortion on educational choice follows as tax rates are pos-
itive, φt > 1. Taxation hits educated workers more severely than manual
workers, which reduces the incentives of education. Hence, positive tax
21This clearly follows by deﬁnition as W is concave in (1−ˆ e), and reaches its maximum
when (1 − uh)ω
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educate themselves.
From this we can conclude that welfare always increases when more
workers educate themselves when ψ ≤ 1.W h e n ψ is smaller than unity
there is an ineﬃciently low stock of educated workers both because pos-
itive tax rates hit educated workers more severely and because manual
workers face attractive informal sector employment opportunities. When
ψ =1 , the fact that tax rates are positive, implies that it is still welfare
improving that more workers educate themselves. When ψ>1, the pun-
ishment of the informal sector works as an instrument to counteract the
distortion created by the tax rates. Further increases in ψ above unity
eventually fully counteract the distortion of the tax system, making the
market solution stock of educated workers being socially optimal.
Let us now consider the optimal design of tax and punishment systems.
Since welfare depends on the division of labour across sectors, and the
labour division depends on the tax rates separate from the wedge, we
choose the punishment rates to maximize welfare accounting for that the
tax rates adjust to balance the government budget restriction. We use (32)
to write the tax rates as a function of the punishment rates as φt = h(φp),
where
∂φt
∂φp < 0 if we assume that we are located on the positively sloped
side of the Laﬀer curves. See appendix for details.
Maximizing W in equation (35), (36), and (37) with respect to φp
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We can conclude that:
Proposition 7 Welfare is maximized when the punishment rate is chosen
such that the informal sector is punished to a larger extent than the formal
sector is taxed, i.e., ψ∗ > 1.
The Proof is given in the Appendix. In case the government has a
positive revenue requirement, R>0, tax rates have to be positive, and
the optimal wedge is larger than unity.22
22A zero tax rate also implies that there are no informal sector that can be punished.
Hence it is not possible to obtain the revenue requirements, R unless φ
t > 1.
24 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?The intuition for the result in proposition 7 follows from that the ed-
ucational stock is ineﬃciently low in case ψ ≤ 1.T h e ﬁrst term in (39)
captures how welfare is aﬀected when more workers acquire education. Re-
call from Section 3.4 that the number of educated workers increases with
increased punishment of the informal sector. Hence as welfare always
increases with additional punishment as long as ψ ≤ 1, it is optimal to in-
crease the punishment rates above unity to create incentives for education.
However, the second term in (39) becomes negative when ψ exceeds unity.
This term captures how the value of being a manual worker is aﬀected by
ψ.W h e nψ deviates from unity there is a distortion between the informal
and the formal sector. Regarding the second term, if ψ<1,t o om u c h
work from a welfare point of view is carried out in the informal sector,
and vice versa when ψ>1.23 Hence, when ψ<1, welfare improves when
increasing ψ both because it increases the stock of educated workers and
because it reduces the distortion between the informal and formal sector.
However, when ψ>1, additional punishment of the informal sector brings
about a negative eﬀect on welfare as it increases the distortion between
the formal and the informal sector. Eventually, further increases in the
punishment rates will induce welfare to fall.
From proposition (7), we can conclude that:
Corollary 8 The number of educated workers are below what is socially
optimal when the punishment rate is chosen optimally, i.e., when ψ = ψ∗.
This follows from the ﬁrst order condition determining the optimal
punishment rate (39) and equation (38), where the socially optimal num-
ber of educated workers are determined by ∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) =0 . From (39) we ob-
serve that the welfare maximizing punishment rate is set so that ∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) >
0,f u l ﬁlling the ﬁrst order condition as the second term is negative for
ψ>1, which implies that the educated stock is below what is socially op-
timal. This intuitively follows as it is not optimal to set the punishment so
to fully correct for the ineﬃciently low stock of educated workers, as such
a choice implies a distortion between the formal and the informal sector.
As it is a trade-oﬀ between the two distortions, it is never optimal to fully
eliminate one of the them.
23This is further made clear by noting that total vacancies per unemployed workers
are maximized, and the manual unemployment rate, is minimized when ψ =1 .
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formal sector is punished to a larger extent than the formal sector is taxed,
i.e., ψ>1, should clearly not be taken literally. Merely it points at that
it is potentially important for welfare to acknowledge that employment
opportunities in an informal sector may reduce the incentive to acquire
education.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined the consequences of the fact that work opportu-
nities in the informal sector mainly face workers at the lower end of the
skill distribution. When considering the individual choice of higher educa-
tion, we usually think that the wage premium of education and the relative
employment probabilities are the important factors to weight against the
cost of education. However, acknowledging that mainly manual sector
workers face work opportunities in the informal sector, these workers may
have much better employment perspectives than what is revealed by just
considering formal sector wages and unemployment rates. Hence, infor-
mal sector employment opportunities may reduce the incentives to acquire
higher education and thereby reduce the educated labour force.
This paper developed a three-sector general equilibrium model featur-
ing matching frictions and worker-ﬁrm wage bargains. Workers diﬀered
with respect to ability, and the choice of education was endogenously de-
termined. Job opportunities in an informal sector were only available to
manual workers. We asked if increased punishment of the informal sec-
tor and/or reduced taxation induced more workers to educate themselves.
The answer to that question was yes, and the story just told provides the
intuition behind this result.
The second aim of this paper was to study how labour market per-
formance, and in particular unemployment, where aﬀected by increased
punishment of the informal sector and/or reduced taxation. Although
some recent studies have shed light on how punishment policies aﬀects
unemployment, this papers uses a framework which enabled us to study
the impact of tax and punishment policies when workers are searching in
both a formal and an informal sector. We found that increased punish-
ment, most likely would reduce the number of unemployed workers.
Finally, the paper characterized the optimal tax and punishment sys-
tem. We showed that it was optimal to punish the informal sector to a
26 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?larger extent than the formal sector is taxed. The optimal choice of tax
and punishment system, however, implied an ineﬃciently low stock of ed-
ucated workers. The results show that it potentially is important to take
into account the impact of the employment opportunities in the informal
sector on education, as it in turn, may have consequences for welfare.
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6.1 Equilibrium
We will draw the equilibrium for the manual sector in a diagram with
search intensity, σ,o nt h eﬁrst axis and relative tightness on the second
axis, θF
θI . We draw two curves, one representing the two ﬁrst equilibrium
equations, (27) and (28), denoted θF
θI (σ),t h a ti sw eh a v er e l a t i v el a b o u r
market tightness as a function of search intensity, σ. The other curve







Consider the case when η = 1
2. In this case we can solve explicitly for
labour market tightness in the two sectors, and then deriving θF
θI (σ) we can




θI (σ) < 0. That is, a higher search
intensity into the informal sector reduces relative labour market tightness.
Furthermore, the curve is independent of the wedge, ψ.T h ec u r v er e p r e -














corresponding to that search intensity in the informal sector decreases
with relative labour market tightness as job opportunities becomes rel-


















θI (σ) we can





is steeper than the slope of θF
θI (σ).G i v e nt h a t
an equilibrium exists it will therefore be unique and stable. See the next
section for intuition for stability. We illustrate this in Figure 1 for ψ<1.






θI (σ) is the ﬂatter curve.
6.2 The impact of an increase in the wedge





,t h a ti s ,





. The relative labour market
tightness, θF
θI (σ), curve is not aﬀected. The new equilibrium is where





, and the relative labour market
30 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?tightness curve, θF
θI (σ) , intersect. See Figure 2.
When the punishment rates increase relative to the tax rates, ψ in-
creases, search intensity falls for given relative labour market tightness,
θF
θI . We move from the initial equilibrium horizontally to the left till the
new search intensity curve is reached. A lower search intensity increases
relative tightness as it induces a reduction in formal producer wages and
an increase in informal producer wages. In the diagram, this corresponds
to a vertical movement until we reach the relative labour market tightness
curve. This, in turn, causes another reduction in search intensity, how-
ever the impact is now smaller than before. And again, the decrease in σ
implies that relative tightness increases. The impacts become smaller and
smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
6.3 Proofs of propositions and lemmas
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :









































































σ2−γ(1−σ)γ > 0. From
equation (30) it is apparent that tightness in sector h is not aﬀected by
changes in the tax or punishment rates. A closer look at (32) reveals that
the government can choose φt and φp = ψφt for a given ψ so to increase
or reduce revenues in order to balance its budget as long as R is a feasible
r e v e n u er e q u i r e m e n t . W ed on o tn e e dn o th a v et oa s s u m et h a tw ea r e
located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curves.
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Proof. Diﬀerentiate (13) and (14) with respect to ψ, considering that
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From the wage rule for highly educated workers and (21) we observe that
wages in sector h is not aﬀected by changes in the tax and punishment
rates. The reform is fully ﬁnanced, see proof of proposition (1).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :






















































as the transition rate into the formal manual sector unambiguously in-
creases and the transition rate into the informal sector decreases. Fur-
thermore, the actual unemployment rate and the oﬃcial unemployment
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R 1 for ψ Q 1 using the










ρ,h e n c ef o rψ ≤ 1 is
ψ
ρ < 1. T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei ns e c t o rh is unaf-
fected by changes in the tax and punishment system as can be seen from
(26), (21) and λh =( θh)
1−η. The reform is fully ﬁnanced, see proof of
proposition 1.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 :
Proof. Wages in sector h are unaﬀected by the change in ψ and hence
wage dispersion WD increases as
∂ωF
m
∂ψ < 0 from the proof of proposition
2.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 :
Proof. The impact on the number of educated workers of a fully
ﬁnanced change in the punishment rates, φp,i sg i v e nb y
∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φp =
∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φp |φt +
∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φt |φp ∂φt
∂φp. (41)
Using equation (33), (34) and
∂φt
∂φp < 0, we obtain that
∂(1−ˆ e)
∂φp > 0.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 :
Proof. The impact on the total number of unemployed workers of a















which is smaller than zero for um >u h as ∂ˆ e




∂φp < 0. The total number of oﬃcially unemployed workers












which has negative sign as uo
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∂ (1 − ˆ e)
µ
∂ (1 − ˆ e)
∂φp |φt +
















Consider the ﬁrst term, where
∂W
∂ (1 − ˆ e)













> 0. Comparing to the equation for educa-
tional choice (31), which can be written as 1
φt
³




c(ˆ e)=0 ,w ei n f e rt h a t ∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) > 0 for ψ<˜ ψ, ∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) =0for ψ = ˜ ψ,
∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) < 0 for ψ>˜ ψ where where ˜ ψ>1 is the wedge that implies the so-
cially optimal educational stock. Hence, considering the ﬁrst term, welfare
increases in φp until ψ = ˜ ψ and thereafter it decreases with φp.






A − umBk, (45)



























> 0. We can show that ∂Wm
∂ψ is concave in ψ.
From the proofs of proposition 1 and proposition 3 and using equation
(29) we can show that the term is positive for ψ<1, zero for ψ =1 ,a n d












Hence, welfare increases with φp when ψ ≤ 1, and falls with φp when
ψ ≥ ˜ ψ. For 1 <ψ<˜ ψ, welfare most likely increases with φp in order to
reach a maximum at ψ∗ and then falls again. This most likely holds as
∂W
∂(1−ˆ e) becomes smaller and smaller when φp increases within this interval,
and ∂Wm
∂ψ becomes more and more negative within this interval. However,
















take on values such that the sign of ∂W
∂φp takes on
both positive and negative values in this interval, although it seems quite
34 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice?unlikely. Although we cannot rule out this case, it is of no importance for
Proposition 7. This follows as the maximum is found within this interval,
although one may have more than one stationary point. It is then just a
matter of choosing the stationary point which yields the highest welfare.
6.4 The impact on government revenue
The left hand side (LHS) of (32) is the government revenue, whereas the
right hand side is the government revenue requirement. Diﬀerentiating








































































































































































We can divide the inﬂuences on the government revenue into four cat-
egories characterized by each row in the two equations. The ﬁrst row in
each equation captures how revenues are altered by the change in the num-
ber of educated workers in the economy. The second r o wi ne a c he q u a t i o n
gives the impact on revenues as employment in the formal and informal
sector is altered. The third row in each equation captures how revenues
IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational choice? 35are inﬂuenced by changes in the equilibrium producer wage facing manual
workers. Finally, the fourth row gives the direct eﬀect. We have assumed
that the auditing costs are independent of ψ. However, it is straightfor-
ward to assume that is a function of, for example, ψ. This simply adds an
additional eﬀect on the government revenue.
Since the dynamic eﬀects move in diﬀerent directions it is diﬃcult to
determine whether they reinforce or weaken the direct eﬀect. If we say
that we are located on the upward sloping part of the Laﬀer curves, we
assume that ∂LHS
∂φp |φt > 0 and ∂LHS
∂φt |φp > 0. T h a ti s ,t h ed y n a m i ce f -
























R =0 .D i ﬀerentiating G
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< 0, which is used in the proofs of propositions (5), (6),
(10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9).
If we instead assume that the direct eﬀect is dominated by indirect
negative eﬀects, we assume that ∂LHS
∂φp < 0 and ∂LHS
∂φt < 0. This is referred













< 0. Hence propositions (5),
(6), (10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9) holds also in this case. Propositions
(5), (6), (10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9), however, do not hold if we have
sign ∂LHS
∂φp |φt 6= sign ∂LHS
∂φt |φp.
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